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Initially developed by Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore as a
modest regional trade agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has
evolved over nineteen formal negotiating rounds into a major plurilateral
trade agreement between twelve countries that represent nearly 40% of
global GDP.1 While the TPP has been hailed as “a landmark 21st-century
agreement” that sets a new standard for global trade, it has also been criti-
cized as a political grasp for economic regulatory power that has undermined
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and, specifically with regard to intel-
lectual property, forced strong “one size fits all” intellectual property stan-
dards on developing countries.2 In particular, some academics and public
interest groups have condemned the TPP’s copyright provisions as an at-
tempt to export the United States’ “maximalist” copyright agenda into an
agreement that can serve as a model for later trade pacts.3
However, on closer examination, the final text of the TPP’s copyright
section contains flexibilities that allow contracting parties to tailor domestic
legislation to fit their own political and cultural needs, all while providing
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1. Overview of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP.,
https://ustr.gov/tpp/overview-of-the-TPP (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
2. See, e.g., Larry Cata´ Backer, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Japan, China, the
U.S., and the Emerging Shape of New World Trade Regulatory Order, 13
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 49, 59 (2014); Sean M. Flynn et al., The U.S.
Proposal for an Intellectual Property Chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 105, 106 (2012).
3. See, e.g., Jeremy Malcolm, New TPP Leaked Text Reveals Countries’ Weaken-
ing Resistance to Copyright Maximalist Proposals, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.
(Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/08/new-tpp-leaked-text-re
veals-weakening-resistance-maximalist-proposals.
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adequate protection for creative works in the digital age.4 This article begins
with a brief overview of international copyright law then proceeds to analyze
several provisions in the TPP’s copyright section. Then, the anti-circumven-
tion and rights management provisions are analyzed in light of other jurisdic-
tions’ experiences in implementing the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and
the WIPO Performances and Phonogram Treaty (WPPT). Finally, a set of
best practices are offered to aid in domestic implementation.
II. OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW
Pursuant to Article 18.7 of the TPP, each contracting party must affirm
that it has ratified or acceded to the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention), and each party must ratify
or accede to the WCT and WPPT by the date that the TPP enters into force
for that party.5 In addition, the TPP incorporates certain principles of the
WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) and the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Produc-
ers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations (Rome Convention).6
Thus, a brief overview of these treaties will help frame the discussion of the
copyright provisions in the TPP.
A. Berne Convention
Enacted in 1886, the Berne Convention was the first multilateral copy-
right treaty and the foundational piece of international copyright law.7 It pro-
tects artistic and literary works and the rights of their authors through three
basic principles (national treatment, automatic protection, and independence
of protection) and a set of minimum standards that govern both the rights to
be granted and the duration of protection.8 Member states must protect the
economic and moral rights of authors for “every production in the literary,
4. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ch. 18, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., Feb.
4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Intellectual-Property
.pdf [hereinafter TPP].
5. Id. art. 18.7.
6. How the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Will Affect Copyright and Digi-
tal Rights in Mexico, OLIVARES (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.olivares.com.mx/
En/Knowledge/News/HowtheTransPacificPartnershipAgreementwillAffect
CopyrightandDigitalRightsinMexico.
7. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30 (as revised at Paris, July 24, 1971)
[hereinafter Berne Convention].
8. Summary of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works (1886), WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/trea-
ties/en/ip/berne/summary_ berne.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) [hereinafter
Berne Summary].
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scientific and artistic domain, whatever the mode or form of its expression.”9
Member states must grant authors economic rights relating to reproductions,
translations, adaptations and arrangements, public performances and recita-
tions, communications to the public, broadcasting, and using a work as the
basis for an audiovisual work.10 But, these economic rights are subject to
certain limitations and exceptions that allow others to use the work without
the authorization of or payment to the owner, the most important of which is
the so-called “three step test.”11 Moral rights include the right to claim au-
thorship of the work and the right to object to any mutilation, deformation, or
other modification of the work that would be harmful to the author’s honor or
reputation.12 Finally, the Berne Convention’s general rule for duration of pro-
tection is the life of the author plus fifty years, subject to certain exceptions
for anonymous or pseudonymous works, audiovisual works, applied art, and
photographic works.13 All parties to the TPP are parties to the Berne
Convention.14
9. Berne Convention, supra note 7, art. 2(1).
10. Berne Summary, supra note 8.
11. See Berne Convention, supra note 7, arts. 9(2) (reproduction in certain special
cases using the “Three Step Test” which allows for reproduction of certain
works (1) in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction, (2) does not
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work, and (3) does not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author); 10 (quotations and use of
works by way of illustration for teaching purposes); 10bis (reproduction of
newspaper or similar articles and use of works for the purpose of reporting
current events); and 11bis(3) (ephemeral recordings for broadcasting purposes).
12. Berne Summary, supra note 8.
13. Berne Convention, supra note 7, arts. 7(3) (protecting anonymous or pseudony-
mous works for fifty years after the work has been lawfully made available to
the public, except if the pseudonym leaves no doubt as to the author’s identity
or if the author discloses his or her identity during that period, in which case
the general rule applies); 7(4) (protecting audiovisual works for fifty years after
the making available of the work to the public or, if not released, fifty years
from the creation of the work); 7(4) (protecting works of applied art and photo-
graphic works for twenty-five years from the creation of the work).
14. Press Release, Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Office of
the U.S. Trade Rep., Oct. 4, 2015, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/
press-office/press-releases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacific-partnership
(listing the twelve parties to the TPP as Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada,
Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States,
and Vietnam); WIPO-Administered Treaties: Contracting Parties > Berne
Convention, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/
en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15 (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
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B. Rome Convention
In many civil law jurisdictions, protection of authors is treated sepa-
rately from protection of performers, producers of phonograms, and broad-
casters, with the former typically protected by “copyright” and the latter by
“neighboring rights.”15 The logic behind this separation of rights appears to
be that the object of protection for neighboring rights is the diffusion (as
opposed to the creation) of literary and artistic works, and such rights are
derived from the author’s rights.16 Conversely, common law jurisdictions,
such as the United States and the United Kingdom, assimilate both of these
under the rubric of “copyright.”17 Because the Berne Convention protects
only authors, the primary goal of the Rome Convention was to extend certain
protections to performers, producers of phonograms, and broadcasters, and
require national treatment for neighboring rights.18 All parties to the TPP,
except for Brunei, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United States,
are parties to the Rome Convention.19
C. TRIPS Agreement
Adopted in April 1994, TRIPS incorporated the substantive provisions
of the Berne Convention, with the exception of moral rights, and expanded
protection by recognizing computer programs and databases as copyrightable
works, providing rental rights and extending the duration of protection for
neighboring rights to fifty years.20 TRIPS also coupled the protection levels
of the Berne and Rome Conventions with national treatment and the “most
favored nation” principle, which requires any advantage granted by a WTO
member to the nationals of any other country be granted immediately to the
nationals of all other WTO members.21 The primary impact of TRIPS was:
(1) link intellectual property to trade and dramatically expand enforcement
provisions that were lacking in the Berne and Rome Conventions; and (2)
make disputes between WTO members regarding their TRIPS obligations
15. E.g., Roberto Garza Barbosa, Revisiting International Copyright Law, 8 BARRY
L. REV. 54, 54–58 (2007).
16. See id. at 54–55.
17. Id. at 54.
18. Id. at 56.
19. WIPO-Administered Treaties: Contracting Parties > Rome Convention,
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowRe
sults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=17 (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
20. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, An-
nex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS].
21. Id.; see also Paul F. Downs, The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Conflicting
Customary International Norms, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 661, 666–67
(2013).
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subject to the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures.22 All parties to the TPP
are parties to TRIPS.23
D. WCT and WPPT
The WCT and WPPT, often called the “WIPO Internet Treaties,” ad-
dress the protection of works and the rights of authors, performers, and pro-
ducers of phonograms in the digital environment.24 Under the WCT, authors
are granted rights in addition to those in the Berne Convention, including the
right of distribution, rental, and communication to the public.25 The WPPT
grants producers of phonograms certain economic rights in their perform-
ances, including the rights of reproduction, distribution, rental, and making
available.26 These treaties are discussed further below in Section IV in con-
nection with Articles 18.68–18.69 of the TPP and rights management best
practices.27 All parties to the TPP, except for Brunei, New Zealand, and Viet-
nam, are parties to the WCT and WPPT.28
III. CERTAIN COPYRIGHT PROVISIONS IN THE TPP
A. Exclusive Rights
As stated above, Article 18.7 of the TPP requires all parties to accede to
or ratify the Berne Convention, the WCT, and the WPPT, and, thus, the sub-
stantive provisions of each treaty will apply to all TPP parties.29 Articles
18.58–18.62 of the TPP primarily restate these rights and bring them within
22. E.g., Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture of International Intellectual Property
Law Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977, 983–86 (2014).
23. Other IP Treaties: IP-Related Multilateral Treaties > Contracting Parties >
TRIPS Agreement, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/
wipolex/en/other_treaties/parties.jsp?treaty_id=231&group_id=22 (last visited
Jan. 31, 2018).
24. WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 1, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36
I.L.M. 65, [hereinafter WCT]; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty,
art. 1(2), Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 [hereinafter WPPT]; Barbosa, supra note
15, at 59–62.
25. WCT, supra note 24, arts. 6–8.
26. WPPT, supra note 24, arts. 7–10, 11–14.
27. See discussion infra Section IV.
28. WIPO-Administered Treaties: Contracting Parties > WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=20 (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
29. TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.7.
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the TPP’s enforcement and investor-state dispute resolution (ISDR) frame-
work.30 Nevertheless, three aspects of Articles 18.58–18.62 are noteworthy.
First, Article 18.58 maintains the flexibility created by the WIPO In-
ternet Treaties regarding whether temporary electronic copies produced in
the RAM of computers constitute a “reproduction.”31 The WIPO Internet
Treaties limit the reproduction right to copies fixed “in any manner or form”
and allow contracting parties to define when such “RAM copies” are suffi-
ciently fixed.32 Although the United States’ draft TPP proposal granted re-
production rights to works “in any manner or form, permanent or temporary,
including temporary storage in electronic form,”33 the final language in Arti-
cle 18.58 was limited to “in any manner or form, including in electronic
form,” and footnote 64 clarifies the parties are free to determine when tempo-
rary electronic copies trigger the reproduction right.34 Second, with regard to
phonograms, Article 18.61 eliminates the traditional hierarchy in which au-
thors’ rights under “copyright” are usually more extensive than the “related
rights” of performers and producers of phonograms.35 The draft proposed by
the United States included this provision and reflects a growing trend to har-
monize rights of authors with related rights holders, at least with regard to
music.36 Finally, Article 18.62.2 grants performers the exclusive right to
broadcast and communicate to the public their unfixed performances.37 In the
United States, the federal Copyright Act does not protect unfixed works,
which may be protected under state laws.38 Therefore, in the United States
and in any other TPP parties that require fixation before granting protection,
Article 18.62.2 will clarify performers’ rights to their unfixed
performances.39
30. Id. arts. 18.58–18.62; Trans-Pacific Partnership ch. 9, arts. 9.18–9.30, https://
ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Investment.pdf (last visited Jan. 31,
2018).
31. TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.58.
32. WCT, supra note 24, arts. 5–7; WPPT, supra note 24, art. 7.
33. See Trans-Pacific Partnership, Draft: Intellectual Property Rights Chapter, art.
4.1 n.8–10 (Feb. 10, 2011), http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-10feb
2011-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf.
34. See TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.58.
35. Id. art. 18.61; see Barbosa, supra note 15, at 54–55.
36. See Flynn et al., supra note 2, at 132–33.
37. TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.62.2.
38. 17 U.S.C. §102(a) (1990).
39. Roberta L. Horton et al., Extensive IP Provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship, 28 No. 2 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 16, 18 (2016).
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B. Term Extension
Article 18.63 of the TPP extends the term of copyright protection for
works based on the life of a natural person to life of the author plus seventy
years.40 This will require Brunei, Canada (for works other than sound record-
ings for which the term was previously extended),41 New Zealand, Malaysia,
Japan, and Vietnam to enact term extensions to the current term of life of the
author plus fifty years.42 This extends the term of protection beyond that
required by the Berne Convention and will harmonize copyright duration
with the United States and the European Union.43
Proponents of copyright term extensions argue extensions are necessary
to further harmonize copyright law, which will greatly assist with interna-
tional rights clearance and to account for longer life spans of authors and
their heirs.44 Granting term extensions will also give authors in Brunei, Ca-
nada, New Zealand, Malaysia, Japan, and Vietnam an additional twenty
years of protection in many other countries where the term was previously
limited by the Berne Convention’s “rule of the shorter term.”45 But, oppo-
nents argue term extensions amount to a windfall to rights holders with no
accompanying benefit to the public.46 Some commentators claim term exten-
sions could result in a net annual outflow of US$55 million from New Zea-
land and CAD$100 million from Canada.47 A study by the Australian
40. TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.63.
41. See Justin Ling, What the TPP Means for Copyright Law in Canada, NAT’L
MAG., http://nationalmagazine.ca/Articles/November-Web/What-the-TPP-
means-for-copyright-law-in-Canada.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
42. Kamil Ge´rard Ahmed, A Case for A Longer Term of Copyright in Canada –
Implications of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 37 R.D.U.S. 185, 194 n.15 (2006).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1998); Directive 2006/116, 2006 O.J. (L 372) 12.
44. E.g., Ahmed, supra note 42, at 190, 198.
45. Berne Convention, supra note 7, art. 7; see Barry Sookman, TPP, Copyright,
E-Commerce and Digital Policy: A Reply to Michael Geist, BARRY SOOKMAN
BLOG (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.barrysookman.com/2015/12/15/tpp-copy-
right-e-commerce-and-digital-policy-a-reply-to-michael-geist/.
46. Flynn et al., supra note 2, at 135–36; but see Hugh Stevens, The TPP and
Copyright Term Extension: What is The True Cost to Canada?, HUGH STEVENS
BLOG (Mar. 21, 2016), https://hughstephensblog.net/2016/03/21/the-tpp-and-
copyright-term-extension-what-is-the-true-cost-to-canada/.
47. See TPP: In Brief, NEW ZEALAND GOV., https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/all/
files/TPP-Q&A-Oct-2015.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2018); Michael Geist, Ca-
nada Caves on Copyright in TPP: Commits to Longer Term, Urge ISPs to
Block Content, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.michaelgeist
.ca/2015/10/canada-caves-on-copyright-in-tpp-commits-to-longer-term-urge-
isps-to-block-content/; but see Stevens, supra note 46 (noting that a 2005 study
by Industry Canada found that the estimate of costs to Canada of a twenty year
extension was about $2.5 million).
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Productivity Commission suggested that the cost to Australia of extending its
copyright term, resulting from the Australia-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment, has been up to AUS$88 million per year.48 Opponents also argue that
term extensions: (1) constitute an improper misappropriation from the public
domain, although pursuant to Article 18.10.2 of the TPP no works currently
in the public domain would be “recaptured”; (2) do not provide additional
incentives to create copyrightable works; and (3) exacerbate the so-called
“orphan works” problem.49
Regardless of whether extending copyright term to the life of the author
plus seventy years is wise policy, its impact can be mitigated somewhat by
former United States Register of Copyright Maria Pallante’s suggestion to
reintroduce formalities for the additional twenty year period, which is outside
of the Berne Convention’s prohibition on formalities.50 This is possible under
the TPP because the U.S. proposal to ban all formalities, which was included
in the leaked text from October 2014, was ultimately dropped from the final
TPP text.51
C. Limitations and Exceptions to Exclusive Rights
Article 18.65.1 of the TPP recites the familiar three-step test for excep-
tions and limitations to exclusive rights: “each Party shall confine limitations
or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases that do not conflict
with a normal exploitation of the work, performance or phonogram, and do
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.”52
Unlike the WCT and WPPT, which include both enabling language and
confining language,53 Article 18.65 includes only confining language, as is
the case in Article 13 of TRIPS.54 In addition, the TPP does not include the
WCT’s Agreed Statement on the three-step test, which clarifies that con-
48. Productivity Commission 2010, Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements Re-
search Report 166 (Dec. 13, 2010), www.pc.gov.au.
49. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION: A REPORT
OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 1, 10 (2015), http://copyright.gov/orphan/
reports/orphan-works2015.pdf.
50. See Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
315, 336–37 (2013).
51. Krista L. Cox, Analysis of the Final Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Text
on Intellectual Property: Mixed Results, ASSOC. OF RES. LIBRS. 2–3 (Oct. 14,
2015), http://www.arl.org/storage/documents/TPP-Analysis-Final.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 31, 2018).
52. TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.65.1.
53. See WCT, supra note 24, art. 10(1)–(2); WPPT, supra note 24, at ch. 4, art.
16(1)–(2); Flynn, supra note 2, at 137.
54. See Flynn et al., supra note 2, at 138. Compare TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.65,
with TRIPS, supra note 20, art. 13.
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tracting parties may devise new exceptions for the digital environment and
carry forward existing exceptions under the Berne Convention.55
On closer examination, the possibility that Article 18.65.1 could be in-
terpreted as a new, stricter version of the three-step test, especially within the
digital environment, appears to be lessened by Article 18.65.2, which states
that Article 18.65.1 “does not reduce or extend the scope of applicability” of
exceptions permitted by TRIPS, the Berne Convention, the WCT, or the
WPPT.56 In addition, Article 18.66 includes language recognizing the impor-
tance of achieving an appropriate balance between the various stakeholders
impacted by copyright law, with a nod to several of the considerations found
in the fair use doctrine in the United States.57 Many commentators see this as
a welcome shift in the United States Trade Representative’s negotiating posi-
tion, as opposed to the United States’ more common tactic of exporting a
maximalist version of rights but omitting the concomitant exceptions found
in U.S. copyright law.58
Finally, it should be noted Article 9.1 includes intellectual property
within the definition of “investments” that are protected by the TPP’s invest-
ment chapter.59 While Article 9.8(5) provides limitations on intellectual prop-
erty rights (including copyright exceptions per footnote 19 in Chapter 9) that
are consistent with both TRIPS and Chapter 18 of the TPP are excluded from
the ISDR framework), copyright exceptions that exceed the scope of those
allowed by the TPP and TRIPS could theoretically constitute an expropria-
tion that is subject to an ISDR proceeding.60
D. Parallel Imports
While the United States’ leaked proposal from February 2011 included
a ban on parallel importation,61 Article 18.11 of the TPP makes clear that
nothing in the TPP prevents a party from determining whether or under what
conditions the exhaustion of intellectual property rights applies under its le-
gal system.62 In other words, contracting parties are free to adopt a system of
international exhaustion so the party’s nationals may import copyright-pro-
55. WCT, supra note 24, at n.8.
56. TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.65.2.
57. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 107 (2017); see also TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.66.
58. See Krista L. Cox, The Intellectual Property Chapter of the Trans-Pacific Part-
nership Agreement and Investment in Developing Nations, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L.
1045, 1045, 1047–50 (2014).
59. TPP, supra note 4, ch. 9, art. 9.1 (containing the investment chapter).
60. See Steven Seidenberg, US Perspectives: TPP Strengthens Controversial IP
Arbitration, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.ip-watch.org/
2015/11/30/tpp-strengthens-controversial-ip-arbitration/.
61. See Draft: Intellectual Property Rights Chapter, supra note 33, art. 4.2.
62. TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.11.
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tected goods lawfully acquired in other territories.63 In addition, footnote 82
permits contracting parties to allow the sale or use of devices that render
market segmentation measures ineffective so imported physical copies of
movies may be played despite the presence of region coding.64 This appears
to be a concession made for Australia and New Zealand.65
IV. TPP, THE WIPO INTERNET TREATIES,
AND RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
The WIPO Internet Treaties were the first international copyright trea-
ties to protect the technological protection measures (TPM) and rights man-
agement information (RMI) authors use to protect their works in the digital
world.66 The WCT and WPPT entered into force on March 6, 2002 and May
20, 2002, respectively, and each currently has ninety-five signatories.67 Each
treaty requires contracting parties to implement domestic legislation giving
effect to new TPM and RMI protection schemes, both of which are based
largely on the United States draft agreement proposed at the 1996 WIPO
diplomatic conference in Geneva.68 The U.S. proposal was ultimately soft-
ened at the diplomatic conference, and the WIPO Internet Treaties that
emerged contained language giving contracting parties more flexibility for
domestic implementation.69 This flexibility led to different approaches in the
European Union and certain TPP parties, including the United States, Japan,
Australia, and Canada. By analyzing the successes and failures of the various
approaches, a set of best practices can be distilled for countries that have not
yet ratified the WIPO Internet Treaties, such as Vietnam. These best prac-
tices can also aid in interpreting the requirements of Articles 18.68 and 18.69
of the TPP.
63. Cox, The Intellectual Property Chapter, supra note 58, at 1052–53.
64. TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.68 n.82.
65. David Farrar, TPP: The Battle for the IP Chapter, NAT’L BUS. REV. (Oct. 8,
2015), https://www.nbr.co.nz/opinion/tpp-battle-ip-chapter; Copyright, Parallel
Imports and Exhaustion of Distribution Rights, DERECHOS DIGITALES-CHILE,
https://www.citizen.org/do cuments/TPP%20Derechos%20C%20Parallel%20
Imports%20and%20Exhaustion.pdf. (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
66. See WCT, supra note 24; WPPT, supra note 24; Press Release, WCT Enters
into Force, WIPO (Mar. 6, 2002) [hereinafter WCT Enters into Force]. For
simplicity, as used in this section, the term “authors” encompasses authors,
performers, and producers of phonograms, and the term “works” encompasses
works, performances, and phonograms.
67. WCT, supra note 24; Press Release, WCT Enters into Force, supra note 66.
68. WCT, supra note 24, art. 14; WPPT, supra note 24, art. 23; Cox, supra note
57, at 1050–51, 1055 n.38.
69. Cox, The Intellectual Property Chapter, supra note 58, at 1051; Flynn et al.,
supra note 2 (discussing generally the flexibilities inherent in the WTO and
TRIPS).
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A. Technological Protection Measures
The TPP requires contracting parties to provide adequate legal protec-
tion and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective
TPMs that authors use in connection with the exercise of their rights and that
restrict unauthorized acts in respect of their works.70 Such protection includes
restrictions on circumventing TPMs controlling the access to a work, such as
encryption or scrambling content, and prohibitions on the trafficking in de-
vices that enable circumvention of TPMs controlling both access to and use
of a work, such as restrictions on copying or printing.71 To help achieve bal-
ance in their anti-circumvention regimes, contracting parties may also create
limitations and exceptions that enable circumvention of TPMs or the supply
of circumventing devices for certain authorized purposes, but subject to a
host of restrictions on such limitations.72 Finally, the TPP mandates civil and
criminal penalties for unauthorized circumvention of TPMs or trafficking in
circumventing devices with the sanctions’ severity depending on the type of
circumvention and the person engaged in the unauthorized act.73 These three
separate, but interdependent concepts—scope of protection, exceptions and
limitations, and remedies—present policymakers with opportunities to tailor
legislation to fit the unique needs of their country, while at the same time
complying with the TPP’s requirements.
1. Scope of Protection
a. TPP
A combination of definitions and substantive provisions determine the
scope of the TPM requirements in the TPP, the WIPO Internet Treaties, and
related domestic implementing legislation. As for definitions relating to
TPMs, the TPP is rather limited. The only specific definition in the TPP is
effective technological measure, defined as any effective technology, device,
or component that, in the normal course of its operation, controls access to a
protected work or protects copyright or related rights (i.e., copy controls)
relating to a work.74 Thus, TPMs under the TPP include both access and copy
controls. The term “effective” is not defined, but footnote 95 clarifies that if a
TPM can be accidentally circumvented, it is not an “effective” TPM.75
While the definitions in the TPP are limited, the substantive provisions
and footnotes in Article 18.68(1)(a) and (1)(b) provide clarity on the scope of
70. TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.68.
71. Id.
72. Flynn et al., supra note 2, at 146.
73. See TPP, supra note 4, arts. 18.74, 18.77.
74. TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.68.5 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at n.95.
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protection. Like the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),76 only the
act of circumventing access controls is prohibited.77 Thus, users may circum-
vent copy controls to make use of a work but such use would be subject to a
copyright infringement claim if it violates an exclusive right of copyright and
is not allowed by a defense or privilege, such as fair use. In addition, a user
cannot be liable for accidental circumvention of access controls: he or she
must know or have reasonable grounds to know that the act constitutes an
unauthorized circumvention.78
Trafficking in circumvention devices or services is prohibited if the de-
vice or service: (1) is advertised or marketed for circumvention; (2) has only
a limited commercially significant purpose or use other than for circumven-
tion; or (3) is primarily designed for the purpose of circumvention.79 But,
footnote 85 provides that a contracting party may limit the anti-trafficking
provision to the manufacture, importation, or distribution of devices or ser-
vices that are undertaken for sale or rental, or if such activities prejudice the
interests of the rights holder.80 In addition, Article 18.68(2) includes a “no
mandate” provision that reassures device makers that they need not design
products in response to any particular TPM, as long as the device does not
otherwise violate Article 18.68(1)(b).81
b. Other Jurisdictions
The scope of the DMCA is roughly the same as Article 18.68 of the
TPP, unsurprising given the United States’ dominant position in TPP negoti-
ations.82 But, the scope of the WIPO Internet Treaties is much more limited
than the TPP and the DMCA, which enabled Japan and Australia to create
flexible anti-circumvention regimes.83 The WIPO Internet Treaties merely re-
quire contracting parties to provide adequate legal protection and effective
76. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012) [hereinafter
DMCA].
77. See TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.68.1(a); DMCA, supra note 76, at 2–3.
78. TPP, supra note 4, arts. 18.69, 18.74.3, 18.68.1(a) n.88.
79. Id. art. 18.68.1(b)(i)–(iii).
80. Id. art. 18.68.1(b) n.85.
81. Id. art. 18.68.2.
82. DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.68; Cox, The Intel-
lectual Property Chapter, supra note 58, at 1057.
83. Cox, The Intellectual Property Chapter, supra note 58, at 1055–56; Gwen
Hinze, Brave New World, Ten Years Later: Reviewing the Impact of Policy
Choices in the Implementation of the WIPO Internet Treaties’ Technological
Protection Measure Provisions, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 779, 787–88 (2007);
Jie “Jerry” Hua, Toward a More Balanced Model: The Revision of Anti-Cir-
cumvention Rules, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 327, 358 (2013).
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legal remedies against circumvention of effective TPM.84 The treaties do not
specify whether this requires protection of access controls or simply copy
controls and do not include a specific ban on devices or services used for
circumvention.85
Japan bases its implementing legislation on a unique relationship be-
tween copyright law and unfair competition law.86 Article 120bis of the Japa-
nese Copyright Law (JCL) prohibits only the circumvention of copy
controls.87 This is because the definition of TPM is limited to measures that
prevent or deter infringement of copyright, moral rights, or related rights, and
the JCL does not recognize a separate “access right” within the exclusive
rights granted to authors.88 Because circumventing access controls cannot
lead to copyright infringement, the JCL does not prohibit it.89 Instead, the
Japanese Unfair Competition Prevention Law (JUCPL) covers access con-
trols.90 The JCL prohibits the circumvention of copy controls if done com-
mercially “in response to a request from the public,” meaning the JCL
contains no prohibition of non-commercial circumvention.91 The ban on traf-
ficking in devices under the JCL is limited to devices disseminated to the
public and have the principal function of circumventing copy controls.92
Thus, creating a circumvention device for non-commercial use by a specific
person will not lead to liability under the JCL.93 In addition, devices are lim-
ited to tangible devices or software and do not include items such as research
papers, which have been the subject of litigation under the DMCA.94
The JUCPL covers trafficking in devices, but not the actual act of cir-
cumvention.95 It prohibits trafficking in devices that circumvent both access
and copy controls because the JUCPL’s goal is to protect content providers
84. WCT, supra note 24, art. 11; WPPT, supra note 24, art. 18.
85. WCT, supra note 24, art. 11; WPPT, supra note 24, art. 18; Hinze, supra note
83, at 785–90.
86. Hua, supra note 83, at 358.
87. Copyright Act, No. 48 of 1970 (Japan) (as amended up to Act No. 65 of De-
cember 3, 2010, art. 120bis); Hua, supra note 83, at 358.
88. Id. art. 2(1)(xx).
89. Id. art. 120.
90. See Unfair Competition Prevention Act, No. 47 of 1993, art. 2 (Japan); Hua,
supra note 83, at 358.




95. Unfair Competition Prevention Act, No. 47, art. 2(1)(xi)–(xii); Hua, supra note
83, at 358–59.
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who charge fees for access to and use of technology-protected content.96 The
JUCPL does not distinguish between copyright-protected material and mate-
rial in the public domain as it is designed to operate outside of copyright and
both forms of material can constitute commercial goods that should be pro-
tected against unfair trade practices.97
Australia’s original implementing legislation, the Copyright Amend-
ment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (DAA), also did not prohibit the act of cir-
cumvention and, instead, focused on prohibiting the trafficking in
circumvention devices and services.98 Like the JCL, the DAA limited the
definition of TPM to measures that prevent the infringement of copyright to
protect against overbroad application of the law.99 In addition, the DAA es-
tablished a unique system that enabled certain qualified persons to obtain
circumvention devices for specific permitted purposes.100 But, a framework
based on the DMCA largely replaced the DAA after Australia signed a free
trade agreement with the United States in 2004.101
In the European Union, Directive 2001/29/EC, concerning the harmoni-
zation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information
society (Copyright Directive), governs the implementation of the WIPO In-
ternet Treaties in the European Union102 The Copyright Directive prohibits
the act of circumventing access and copy controls, as well as devices that
circumvent both.103 Originally, the European Council deleted the term “ac-
cess” from the definition of TPM, which would have limited protection only
to copy controls, but ultimately “access” was added to the definition of “ef-
fective,” extending protection to both—an example of how definitions can
significantly impact the scope of protection.104 Unlike the JCL and DAA, but
similar to the DMCA and the TPP, the Copyright Directive does not ex-
pressly require a nexus between circumvention and copyright infringement,
leading to a split among European Union member states on whether to in-
clude such a nexus.105
In the United States, the DMCA prohibits circumvention of access con-
trols but not copy controls and prohibits trafficking in devices that circum-
96. See id.
97. Id.
98. Hinze, supra note 83, at 815.
99. Id. at 816.
100. Id. at 817.
101. Id. at 815.
102. Id. at 807.
103. Id. at 807–08.
104. See Hinze, supra note 83.
105. Id. at 808.
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vent both.106 Similar to the Copyright Directive, the DMCA contains no
specific nexus between circumvention and copyright infringement, which has
led to a significant amount of litigation relating to misuse of the DMCA for
anti-competitive purposes, at least with regard to prohibited devices.107 For
example, a computer printer company has used the prohibition on devices
that circumvent access in order to block the use of refillable ink cartridges in
its printers; a garage door company attempted to prevent competitors from
making interoperable garage door openers; and a data-storage hardware com-
pany blocked an independent software repair company from repairing its
products.108 In response, several courts in the United States have required a
“reasonable relationship” between circumvention of access controls and cop-
yright infringement or the facilitation of infringement before imposing
liability.109
2. Exceptions and Limitations
a. TPP
Unlike most domestic legislation implementing the WIPO Internet Trea-
ties, Article 18.68(4) of the TPP does not include specifically enumerated
exceptions to the anti-circumvention provisions.110 Instead, the TPP allows
contracting parties to provide for exceptions in order to “enable non-infring-
ing uses” of works if the anti-circumvention provisions create an “actual or
likely adverse impact” on such non-infringing uses.111 The flexibility inher-
ent in Article 18.68(4) is largely due to the plurilateral nature of the TPP and
the difficulty in requiring all contracting parties to implement the same ex-
ceptions, given the vastly different stages of the parties’ development.112 The
finding of an “actual or likely adverse impact” required to create anti-circum-
vention exceptions must be determined through a legislative, regulatory, or
administrative process, which must consider whether rights holders have al-
ready taken measures to enable users to enjoy exceptions to copyright and
related rights despite the presence of TPMs.113 In addition, exceptions to the
ban on trafficking in devices are allowed only to the extent they enable use of
106. Id. at 794.
107. Id. at 795.
108. Id. at 803.
109. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1204 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, 421 F.3d
1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
110. TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.68.
111. Id. art. 18.68(4)(a).
112. See Cox, The Intellectual Property Chapter, supra note 58, at 1055–58.
113. TPP, supra note 4.
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a permitted anti-circumvention exception by its intended beneficiary.114 Fi-
nally, limitations to the anti-circumvention provisions cannot undermine pro-
tection of TPMs or the legal remedies available for violations of Article
18.68.115
b. Other Jurisdictions
Exceptions to anti-circumvention provisions tend to have an inverse re-
lationship to the scope of TPM protections. The broader and more rigid the
protection scheme, the more exceptions are required to provide the proper
balance between authors’ rights and the rights of the public to enjoy copy-
righted works and vice versa.116 For example, in Japan and under the original
Australian DAA, exceptions are very limited because the scope of protection
is narrow.117 The DAA did not prohibit the act of circumvention, and the JCL
only prohibits the circumvention of copying controls done for commercial
purposes.118 Thus, there are no exceptions required in order for users to make
a permitted use of underlying exceptions to copyright and related rights.
As for exceptions to the ban on trafficking in devices, Japan’s JCL does
not include exceptions, and the JUCPL only allows exceptions for testing and
researching encryption systems.119 Under the JUCPL, no need exists for typi-
cal exceptions relating to law enforcement, non-profit libraries, or teaching
and education as these do not constitute unfair competition and are thus
outside of the law’s scope.120 Australia’s DAA allowed “qualified persons” to
obtain circumvention devices to engage in certain “permitted purposes” relat-
ing to reverse engineering, libraries and archives, educational institutions,
and government actions.121 To maintain the integrity of the system, the quali-
fied person was required to supply a declaration to an administrative agency
including his or her name and address, the basis for claiming “qualified per-
son” status, the name and address of the supplier of the device, a statement
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Hinze, supra note 83, at 792.
117. Copyright Act, No. 48, art. 120; Hinze, supra note 83, at 816–18.
118. Copyright Act, No. 48, art. 120; Hinze, supra note 83, at 815.
119. Unfair Competition Prevention Act, No. 47, art. 19(1)(viii); Copyright Act, No.
48.
120. Hua, supra note 83, at 359 (“Inclusion of protection of access-control techno-
logical measures in competition law rather than copyright law, as enacted in
Japan, does not impose restrictions of non-infringing uses of copyrighted
works, as fair or other non-infringing uses are often for personal or private
purposes that do not significantly influence the fair competition in the market
and the potential benefits generated from the commercial use of the works.”).
121. Copyright Amendment Act 2000 s 1 pt V div 2As 116A (Austl.); Hinze, supra
note 83, at 816–18.
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that the device would be used only for a permitted purpose, and a specific
reference to the applicable exception under Australian copyright law.122 But,
as noted earlier, this system was replaced with a rigid set of seven exceptions
based on the DMCA and an administrative rulemaking process to create tem-
porary exceptions as set forth in the Australia-United States Free Trade
Agreement.123
In contrast, the United States, Canada, and the current TPM regime in
Australia use specific narrow exceptions to the anti-circumvention provisions
to balance the broad scope of their laws.124 The DMCA and the Australia-
United States Free Trade Agreement have seven exceptions for circum-
venting access controls relating to non-profit libraries, law enforcement and
intelligence, reverse engineering software for interoperability, encryption re-
search, protecting minors on the internet, protecting personally identifiable
information, and security testing.125 There are no exceptions to circumventing
copy controls, as those acts are not prohibited.126 Only the reverse engineer-
ing, encryption research, and security testing exceptions apply to the ban on
trafficking in circumventing devices, and there are no enumerated exceptions
to the ban on trafficking in devices that circumvent copy controls.127
The most controversial aspect of the DMCA is the lack of a “fair use”
exception to circumventing TPMs, which has led to a significant amount of
litigation in the United States.128 As interpreted by U.S. courts and the United
States Copyright Office, “the fair use doctrine is not a defense to the act of
gaining unauthorized access to a work” because the DMCA’s protection of
access control TPMs is not concerned with use of the TPM-protected materi-
als after circumvention has occurred.129 As for copy controls, courts have
noted that fair use is still available despite copy control TPMs even though
the means of making fair use of the work might have to occur “the old-
122. Copyright Amendment Act 2000.
123. Hinze, supra note 83, at 819.
124. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201; Copyright Amendment Act 2006, No. 158 (Austl.); Act
to Amend the Copyright Act, S.C. 2012, c 20 (Can).
125. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (d)–(j); Australia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, art. 17.4(7),
Austl.-U.S., May 18, 2004, 118 Stat. 919.
126. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (d)–(j); Australia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, art. 17.4(7),
Austl.-U.S., May 18, 2004, 118 Stat. 919.
127. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (d)–(j); Australia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, art. 17.4(7),
Austl.-U.S., May 18, 2004, 118 Stat. 919.
128. Hinze, supra note 83, at 799.
129. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 458–59 (2d Cir. 2001);
U.S. v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1134–1135 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Uni-
versal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 346 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
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fashioned way” such as re-typing rather than cutting and pasting from digital
media.130
Partly in response to the lack of a general “fair use” or “fair dealing”
exception, the anti-circumvention laws in the United States, Canada and Aus-
tralia also provide for ongoing rulemaking by an administrative body with
the authority to create additional exceptions that are either temporary—for
the United States and Australia—or permanent—for Canada.131 Under the
DMCA, the Librarian of Congress may create exceptions to access controls
every three years if users of a particular class of works are, or are likely to
be, adversely affected in their ability to make non-infringing uses of those
works because of access control TPMs.132 The exceptions must be renewed
every three years and do not apply to the prohibition on trafficking in de-
vices.133 In Australia, the exceptions are reviewed every four years.134
The European Union uses an innovative approach to exceptions as set
forth in the Copyright Directive and the various European Union member
state TPM regimes. Article 5 of the Copyright Directive lists a number of
harmonized exceptions to the rights of reproduction and communication to
the public.135 If a member state chooses to enact an Article 5 exception in its
domestic law, and that exception is included in a specific subset of excep-
tions listed in Article 6(4) such as for libraries, schools, museums, people
with disabilities, or public security, then the member state must ensure the
exception’s benefit is equally available to users who are subject to TPM re-
strictions.136 But, this is subject to a significant limitation: the member state
can only enforce this mandate if the rights holder fails to voluntarily make
the benefit of the exception available to users.137
Article 6(4) also permits, but does not require, member states to create
exceptions so users can circumvent TPMs to make copies for private, non-
commercial use if: (1) fair compensation is paid to the rights holder; (2) the
member state does not prevent the rights holder from adopting measures to
limit the number of copies made; and (3) the exception satisfies the “three
step test” found in international copyright treaties.138 The various exceptions
apply only to circumvention of copy controls (because having legal access to
the work is a prerequisite), they do not apply to trafficking in devices, and
130. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.
131. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)–(D).
132. Id.
133. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A), (C)–(D).
134. Copyright Amendment Act of 2006, No. 158.
135. Council Directive 2001/29/EC, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 167) (on the harmonization
of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society).
136. Id. arts. 5–6(4).
137. Id.
138. Id.
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they are not available if the public can access the TPM-protected work “from
a place and at a time individually chosen by them” (i.e., for on-demand,
interactive services).139
Where rights holders fail to voluntarily make the exceptions available
for TPM-protected works, European Union member states have enforced the
exceptions several different ways, including through a right of self-help that
allows beneficiaries of the exceptions to circumvent the TPM, through an
arbitration or mediation proceeding, a direct right of action in court to en-
force the exceptions through injunctive relief, or an administrative or execu-




The TPP requires civil and criminal remedies for unlawful circumven-
tion of TPMs or trafficking in prohibited devices.141 In order for criminal
remedies to be warranted, the person engaging in the prohibited activity must
have done so willfully, which pursuant to footnote 88 includes a knowledge
element, and “for the purposes of commercial advantage or financial gain.”142
It is unclear from the text of the TPP what “commercial advantage or finan-
cial gain” entails, and a broad reading could capture actions by individuals
that have traditionally been outside the reach of criminal law. Contracting
parties must also provide that a violation of Article 18.68 is independent of
copyright infringement, although this does not apply to circumvention of ac-
cess controls where the party criminalizes such acts through other means.143
Contracting parties may provide that criminal penalties do not apply to non-
profit libraries, museums, archives, educational institutions, or public non-
commercial broadcasting entities, and may also exempt such entities from
civil remedies if the prohibited activity is carried out in good faith without
knowledge that the conduct is prohibited.144
b. Other Jurisdictions
Although each of the TPM regimes discussed above provide for crimi-
nal and civil remedies, which have been viewed as necessary to provide “ef-
fective legal remedies” as required by the WIPO Internet Treaties,145 the
139. Id.
140. Hinze, supra note 83, at 810.




145. See WCT, supra note 24, art. 12; see also WPPT, supra note 24, art. 19.
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breadth and severity of sanctions tend to vary along the same lines as the
relationship between the scope of protection and exemptions.146 That is, in
countries like Japan that have a narrowly tailored protection scheme and few
exceptions, remedies tend to be more severe as activities that would be sub-
ject to minimal sanctions in other countries are not considered prohibited
activities under the JCL.147 In fact, the JCL only provides for criminal reme-
dies because the scope of protection is limited to commercial activities and
piracy.148 In contrast, the JUCPL only provides for civil remedies, including
a demand for cessation and the destruction of illegal circumvention tools,
because unfair competition aims to compensate businesses harmed by unfair
trade practices.149
The DMCA, on the other hand, has a much broader scope and, thus,
provides a wider range of civil and criminal remedies based on the nature of
the circumvention or device trafficking and the type of user engaged in the
prohibited activity.150 The primary civil remedies include injunctions, im-
pounding or destruction of prohibited devices, actual damages, statutory
damages, court costs, and attorney’s fees.151 Courts may reduce or remit dam-
ages if a user proves he or she was not aware, and had no reason to believe,
that the act was prohibited.152 If the user is a non-profit library, archive, edu-
cational institution, or public broadcasting entity, the court must remit dam-
ages if such entity was unaware that its actions were prohibited.153 Criminal
sanctions, including fines, imprisonment, or both, are available for violations
that are done “willfully and for purpose of commercial advantage or private
financial gain.”154
In the European Union, the Copyright Directive requires member states
to provide effective sanctions but does not give much detail other than stating
in a recital that sanctions should be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive
and should include the possibility of seeking damages and/or injunctive relief
and, where appropriate, of applying for seizure of infringing material.”155
This has led to different approaches by European Union member states, with
146. See, e.g., Copyright System in Japan: Measures Against Infringement, COPY-
RIGHT RES. & INFO. CTR., http://www.cric.or.jp/english/csj/csj5.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 31, 2018).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Unfair Competition Prevention Act, No. 47, arts. 4–5.





155. Copyright Directive, 2001/29/EC, art. 8.
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some states providing remedies similar to the DMCA and others, such as
Denmark, providing much more relaxed civil and criminal remedies.156
4. Best Practices
While there are legitimate criticisms of the various anti-circumvention
regimes discussed above, it is important to remember the many benefits
TPMs offer to rights holders and users.157 Limiting access to copyrighted
works allows rights holders to engage in price discrimination based on use,
and, thus, users can pay for only the amount of use they desire.158 Otherwise,
all users would have to pay for unlimited access and use, meaning higher
prices for everyone.159 TPMs also facilitate innovation in distribution models
on different platforms and through emerging technology.160 Most impor-
tantly, TPMs allow rights holders to better protect their works better from
piracy.161 This, in turn, reduces the free rider effect, helps lower prices, and
increases the availability of works for society in general.162
Still, improperly structured anti-circumvention laws can be abused,
leading to frustrated users and anti-competitive tactics from rights holders.163
In addition, overly broad TPM laws can actually hinder technological devel-
opment, hinder the dispersion of knowledge and culture, and create backlash
from users that further engenders non-compliance.164 The following best
practices aim to avoid these harmful side effects and maintain the proper
balance between protection of TPMs and the rights of the public to use pro-
tected works.
Identify the proper scope of the TPM regime and carefully tailor its
definitions. The definitions in a TPM regime, such as “technological protec-
tion measure,” “effective,” and “circumvent,” must be carefully drafted be-
cause they determine the breadth of the substantive provisions and can have
unintended consequences if simply “copied and pasted” from the TPP or the
WIPO Internet Treaties.165 In addition, contracting parties should consider
156. See id.
157. See, e.g., WCT, supra note 24; WPPT, supra note 24.
158. See S.J. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination,
in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND
COPYRIGHTS 181, 193 (John Palmer & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. eds., 1986).
159. See, e.g., id.
160. See Pallante, supra note 50, at 327.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See, e.g., Liebowitz, supra note 158, at 188.
164. See Carolina Rossini, TPMs and Access Rights, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July
2, 2012), https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/eff_presentation_on_tpms_and_civ
il_rights_sd.pdf.
165. See, e.g., Cox, The Intellectual Property Chapter, supra note 58, at 1055–56.
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whether some form of express nexus between circumvention and copyright
infringement is appropriate, depending on the overall scope of the regime
and the severity of the possible sanctions.166
Include exceptions to anti-circumvention provisions, which enable users
to benefit from traditional exceptions and limitations to copyright law, and
establish a flexible framework for creating new exceptions to accommodate
rapid technological changes in the digital world. Contracting parties have
significant leeway in structuring exceptions to maintain the proper balance
between rights holders and the public at large.167 Policy makers should draw
on the experiences of the United States, European Union, Canada, Australia,
Japan, and others in designing a framework for anti-circumvention excep-
tions.168 In addition, countries should consider allowing both temporary and
permanent exceptions to be created by an administrative rulemaking proce-
dure, and allow for the re-evaluation of temporary exceptions more fre-
quently than every three to four years to determine if they need to be revised
or replaced.169
Consider creating a TPM misuse defense. Much of the litigation under
the DMCA stems from businesses leveraging TPMs to block competitors and
to extend their rights far beyond what traditional copyright law protects.170
Contracting parties should consider creating a “TPM misuse” defense with
abbreviated procedures and fee shifting provisions to stem such anti-competi-
tive tactics. Contracting parties should also incorporate some form of the “no
mandate” rule found in Article 18.68(2) of the TPP.171
Carefully structure remedies. Overbroad remedies or excessive enforce-
ment can have a chilling effect on certain beneficial activities relating to
circumvention, such as encryption research and reverse engineering for inter-
operability, despite the availability of exceptions.172 In addition, policy mak-
ers should use proportionality in establishing criminal and civil sanctions,
especially for non-profit entities and innocent infringers.173 Criminalizing
common activities in the digital world, which do not significantly prejudice
166. See, e.g., Pallante, supra note 50, at 320.
167. See, e.g., Kaminski, supra note 22, at 47.
168. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 39, at 19.
169. See Pallante, supra note 50, at 332–33.
170. See Russell W. Jacobs, Gutters and Hyperlinks: The DMCA and Proper Posi-
tion of Copyright Management Information, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
163, 164 (2013).
171. TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.68(2).
172. See, e.g., Kaminski, supra note 22, at 50.
173. URS GASSER & SILKE ERNST, BEST PRACTICE GUIDE: IMPLEMENTING THE EU
COPYRIGHT DIRECTIVE IN THE DIGITAL AGE 9 (2006), https://cyber.harvard
.edu/wg_home/uploads/1112/EUCD_Best_Practice_Guide_December_2006
.pdf.
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the rights of copyright owners, often fosters contempt towards copyright
law.174
Consider product labeling requirements for works subject to TPM. Sec-
tion 95d(1) of the German Copyright Act requires that works and other items
protected by TPMs must be clearly labeled with the characteristics of the
TPM and the name or business name of the person who applied the restric-
tions.175 This framework allows the free market to drive innovation in TPM
use and create best practices and market standards through competition and
consumer preferences.176
Tailor the TPM scheme to fit the needs of a given country and its level
of development and policy goals. Contracting parties are free to customize
their TPM regime within the bounds of the TPP’s framework.177 Policy mak-
ers should study other TPM regimes in countries similarly situated in terms
of development and “cherry pick” the provisions that are the most
appropriate.178
B. Rights Management Information
1. TPP
Article 18.69 of the TPP requires contracting parties to protect against
the unauthorized removal or alteration of RMI or the distribution or commu-
nication to the public of RMI that has been unlawfully altered, if the RMI is
attached to a copy of the work or appears in connection with the communica-
tion or the making available of the work to the public.179 Protected RMI is
not expressly limited to electronic information and includes: (1) information
that identifies the work, the author, or other rights holder; (2) information
about the terms and conditions of use of the work; or (3) any numbers or
codes that represent such information.180 But, footnote 96 makes clear that
contracting parties may comply with Article 18.69 by protecting only elec-
tronic RMI.181
Criminal sanctions must be available for unlawful activities if done will-
fully and for purposes of commercial advantage or financial gain, although
contracting parties may exempt non-profit libraries, museums, archives, edu-
174. See Pallante, supra note 50, at 327.
175. Gesetz u¨ber Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [UrhG] [Copyright
Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl I at 1273 art. 95d(1) (Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_urhg/englisch_urhg.html.
176. See id.
177. See TPP, supra note 4.
178. See, e.g., Pallante, supra note 50, at 320–22.
179. TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.69.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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cational institutions, and public non-commercial broadcasting entities from
criminal liability.182 In addition, contracting parties may exempt from the
RMI provisions activities done for law enforcement, security, or other related
governmental purposes.183
2. Other Jurisdiction
The RMI provisions in the TPP largely mirror those of the WIPO In-
ternet Treaties and resulting implementing legislation in the United States,184
European Union, Japan, Australia, and Canada.185 As a result, RMI standards
are largely harmonized around the world, but are subject to certain minor
differences between the various jurisdictions.186 While RMI provisions have
not been the subject of controversy or litigation like anti-circumvention pro-
visions, several issues have emerged relating to RMI at least with regard to
the DMCA, including: (1) what information constitutes RMI and whether
RMI encompasses non-digital information and works; (2) where on the work
the RMI must be located in order to be protected; and (3) the knowledge
standard required for imposing liability.187
As to the first issue, the definition of RMI tends to be similar across the
various jurisdictions discussed in this article.188 But, the TPP, like the
DMCA, does not expressly limit RMI to electronic information.189 In the
United States, some courts have held only electronic information can consti-
tute protected RMI,190 while other courts have noted the DMCA’s language
covers all forms of RMI, “including in digital form.”191 This appears to be
unique to the DMCA because the European Union, Japan, Australia, and Ca-
nada all make clear that protected RMI is limited to electronic information.192
Second, unlike the RMI regimes in the European Union, Japan, Austra-
lia, and Canada, which mirror the TPP language and protect RMI that (1) is
182. Id. art. 18.77.
183. Id.
184. See id.; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–02(a) (including a prohibition on inserting
false RMI into a work, which is not included in the TPP).
185. See WCT, supra note 24; WPPT, supra note 24.




190. See, e.g., Textile Secrets Int’l, Inc. v. Ya-Ya Brand Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1184,
1188 (C.D. Cal. 2007); IQ Grp., Ltd. v. Wiesner Publ’g, LLC, 409 F. Supp. 2d
587, 596 (D.N.J. 2006).
191. See, e.g., Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 304 (3d Cir.
2011); Agence Fr. Presse v. Morel, 769 F. Supp. 2d 295, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
192. See Agence Fr. Presse, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 304.
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attached to, associated with, or embodied in a copy of a work; or (2) appears
in connection with the communication to the public of the work, the DMCA
protects RMI “conveyed in connection with copies” of a work.193 U.S. courts
have disagreed on whether this provision applies only to the removal of RMI
“on a plaintiff’s product or original work” or “from the ‘body’ of, or area
around” the work,194 or whether the RMI need only have some “connection”
to a transmission of the work without immediate physical proximity.195
Finally, questions have arisen regarding the intent or knowledge of the
person removing or altering RMI.196 The TPP, similar to the DMCA, con-
tains a dual, and even triple, knowledge requirement that the person must (1)
knowingly remove or alter RMI, or knowingly distribute RMI or works
knowing that the RMI was altered; and (2) know, or have reasonable grounds
to know, that his or her actions would induce, enable, facilitate or conceal
copyright infringement.197 U.S. courts have had to clarify that a defendant
must have actual knowledge that RMI was removed or altered, and construc-
tive knowledge is insufficient to prove this element, although constructive
knowledge is sufficient to prove that a defendant knew that his actions would
facilitate copyright infringement.198 This “multiple knowledge” requirement
makes it very difficult to prevail on claims brought pursuant to the DMCA’s
RMI provisions.199 The TPP appears to take this into consideration in foot-
note 97, which states that a party may extend the RMI protections to circum-
stances in which a person removes or alters RMI or either distributes or
works with RMI that has been altered, without knowledge, which would pre-
sumably make such claims more viable.200
3. Best Practices
Use explicit language to make clear whether protected RMI includes
non-electronic information. The TPP allows contracting parties to include
193. See Jacobs, supra note 170, at 164.
194. See, e.g., Schiffer Publ’g, Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, L.L.C., No. Civ.A.
03–4962, 2004 WL 2583817, at *1410–11 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2004); Kelly v.
Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1122–23 (C.D. Cal. 1999), rev’d and
remanded, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
195. See, e.g., Murphy, 650 F.3d at 310; Banxcorp v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 723
F. Supp. 2d 596, 609–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
196. See Jacobs, supra note 170, at 164.
197. TPP, supra note 4, art. 4.
198. See, e.g., Gordon v. Nextel Commc’ns & Mullen Adver., Inc., 345 F.3d 922,
926 (6th Cir. 2003); Keogh v. Big Lots Corp., No. 3:04-00738, 2006 WL
11293175, at *5–7 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 27, 2006).
199. See Gordon, 345 F.3d at 926; Keogh, 2006 WL 11293175, at *5–7.
200. TPP, supra note 4, arts. 4, 18.69 n.97.
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both digital and analog information as protected RMI.201 Once policy makers
determine the desired scope of RMI protection, they should use unambiguous
language so the courts and the public know what is or is not prohibited.
Clarify the required proximity between RMI and the work at issue. To
avoid unnecessary litigation, domestic legislation should address issues such
as how RMI is “attached” to a copy to become protected RMI and whether
the term “appears in connection with” includes RMI found in another loca-
tion but accessible through a hyperlink associated with the work.202
Determine whether to allow constructive knowledge, or no knowledge,
that RMI was removed or altered. As shown above, intent and knowledge
requirements tend to be outcome determinative in litigation relating to RMI
protection.203 By relying on footnote 97 and simply requiring a person know,
or have reason to know, that it would enable infringement if he or she re-
moved or altered RMI, or distributed RMI that had been removed or altered
(but without knowledge of the removal or alteration), it becomes much easier
for plaintiffs to bring claims for violations of RMI provisions.204 Once policy
makers have determined the proper scope, they should state this explicitly in
the resulting domestic legislation.
201. See id. art. 6.
202. See Jacobs, supra note 170, at 164.
203. See, e.g., Gordon, 345 F.3d at 926; Keogh, 2006 WL 11293175, at *5–7.
204. See TPP, supra note 4, art. 4.
